We study a linear price impact model including other liquidity takers, whose flow of orders either follows a Poisson or a Hawkes process. The optimal execution problem is solved explicitly in this context, and the closed-formula optimal strategy describes in particular how one should react to the orders of other traders. This result enables us to discuss the viability of the market. It is shown that Poissonian arrivals of orders lead to quite robust Price Manipulation Strategies in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl [24] . Instead, a particular set of conditions on the Hawkes model balances the self-excitation of the order flow with the resilience of the price, excludes Price Manipulation Strategies and gives some market stability. . P. Blanc is grateful to Fondation Natixis for his Ph.D. grant. This research also benefited from the support of the "Chaire Risques Financiers", Fondation du Risque. and Bouchaud [27] and Donier [15]. Extensions or alternatives to the Obizhaeva and Wang model that include non-linear price impact have been proposed by Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied [2], Predoiu, Shaikhet and Shreve [30], Gatheral [19] and Guéant [21] to mention a few. Similarly, the exponential decay of the transient impact is not truly observed on market data, and one should consider more general decay kernels. Alfonsi, Schied and Slynko [5] and Gatheral, Schied and Slynko [20] consider the extension of the Obizhaeva and Wang model when the transient impact has a general decay kernel. Another simplification made by these models is that they generally assume that there is only one large trader, and basically ignore the market orders issued by other participants. However, if one wants to use these models at a higher frequency, they would naturally wonder how these orders (at least the largest ones) can be taken into account. This is one of the contributions of the present paper.
Introduction
When modeling the price of an asset, we typically distinguish at least three different time scales. At the low-frequency level, the price can often be well approximated by a diffusive process. At the other end, when dealing with very high frequencies, some key features of the Limit Order Book (LOB) dynamics have to be modeled. In between, price impact models consider an intra-day mesoscopic time scale, somewhere between seconds and hours. They usually ignore most of the LOB events (limit orders, cancellations, market orders, etc.) and focus on describing the price impact of the transactions. Their goal is to be more tractable than high-frequency models and to bring quantitative results on practical issues such as optimal execution strategies. The pioneering price impact models of Bertsimas and Lo [11] and Almgren and Chriss [6] consider a linear immediate and permanent impact on the price. These models ignore the transient part of the impact which is due to the resilience of the market and cannot be neglected when trading frequently. For that purpose, Obizhaeva and Wang [28] have considered a model that includes in addition a linear transient impact that decays exponentially. However, empirical evidence on market data shows that the price impact is not linear but rather concave, see e.g. Potters and Bouchaud [29] , Eisler et al. [16] , Mastromatteo, Tóth The present paper is a contribution to this also mutually exciting literature. Its main goal is to make a bridge between high-frequency price models and optimal execution frameworks. On the one hand, Hawkes processes seem to be rich enough to describe satisfactorily the flow of market orders. On the other hand, price impact models are tractable and well-designed to calculate trading costs. The aim of our model is to grasp these two features. Thus, we consider an Obizhaeva and Wang framework where market buy and sell orders issued by other traders are modeled through Hawkes processes. This enables us to make quantitative calculations and to solve the optimal execution problem explicitly. Also, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition on the parameters of the Hawkes model to rule out Price Manipulation Strategies that can be seen as high-frequency arbitrages.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and present a general criterion to exclude Price Manipulation Strategies. Section 3 summarizes our main results. In Section 4, we present the optimal execution strategy when market orders are Poissonian and discuss on the robustness of Price Manipulation Strategies in this case. Section 5 gives the main result on the optimal execution problem along with several comments and insights on the optimal strategy. Technical proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
Model setup and the optimal execution problem
We start by describing the price model itself, without considering the execution problem. We consider a single asset and denote by P t its price at time t. We assume that we can write it as the sum of a "fundamental price" component S t and a "mesoscopic price deviation" D t :
Typically, these quantities are respectively related to the permanent and the transient impact of the market orders. We now precise this and consider the framework of Obizhaeva and Wang [28] where these impacts are linear. Let N t be the sum of the signed volumes of past market orders on the book between time 0 and time t. By convention, a buy order is counted positively in N while a sell order makes N decrease, and we assume besides that N is a càdlàg (right continuous with left limits) process. We assume that an order modifies the price proportionally to its size, which would correspond to a block-shaped limit order book. A proportion ν ∈ [0, 1] of the price impact is permanent, while the remaining proportion 1 − ν is transient with an exponential decay of speed ρ > 0. This mean-reversion effect can be seen as the feedback of market markers, who affect the price using limit orders and cancellations. Namely, we consider the following dynamics for S and D:
market orders with q > 0. As usual, we consider (Ω, (F t ), F , P) a filtered probability space where P weights the probability of the market events and the filtration (F t ) t≥0 describes the market information at time t ≥ 0. We assume that the process (N t ) t≥0 is (F t )-adapted with bounded variation and square integrable, i.e. sup s∈[0,t] E[N 2 s ] < ∞ for any t ≥ 0. We will specify later on which dynamics we consider for N .
We now consider a particular trader who wants to buy or sell a given quantity of assets on the time interval [0, T ]. Through the paper, we will call this trader the "strategic trader" to make the distinction between his market orders and all the other market orders, that are described by N . We will denote by X t the quantity of shares owned by the strategic trader at time t. We assume that the process is (F t )-adapted, with bounded variation and càglàd (left continuous with right limits) which means that the strategic trader observes all the information available on the market, and that he can react instantly to the market orders issued by other traders. Thus, a strategy that liquidates x 0 assets on [0, T ] should satisfy X 0 = x 0 and X T + = 0: x 0 > 0 (resp. x 0 < 0) corresponds to to a sell (resp. buy) program. Definition 2.1. A liquidating strategy X for the position x 0 ∈ R on [0, T ] is admissible if it is (F t )-adapted, càglàd, square integrable, with bounded variation and such that X 0 = x 0 and X T + = 0, a.s.
One then has to specify how the strategic trader modifies the price, as well as the cost induced by his trading strategy. Again, we will consider the Obizhaeva and Wang model [28] with the same price impact as above. However, we let the possibility that the proportion ǫ ∈ [0, 1] of permanent impact of the strategic trader could be different from the one of the other traders (which we note ν ∈ [0, 1]). For instance, one could justify that 0 ≤ ǫ < ν should hold if the strategic trader does not hold any "real" economic information when he liquidates his position. We then assume the following dynamics
With the assumptions on N and X, the price processes P , S and D have left and right limits. More precisely, in case of discontinuity at time t, (2) and (3) have to be read here as follows
When the strategic trader places at time t an order of size v ∈ R (v > 0 for a buy order and v < 0 for a sell order), it has the following cost π t (v) = P t v cost at the current price
Since P t+ = P t + v q , this cost amounts to trade all the shares at the price Pt+Pt+ 2 and corresponds to the cost given by a block-shaped Limit Order Book with depth 1/q, since π t (v) = v 0 P t + 1 q y dy, see [28] . We stress here that if an order has just occurred, i.e. N t − N t− = 0, the value of P t is different from P t− and takes into account the price impact of this order. Therefore, the cost of an admissible strategy X is given by
since at time T all the remaining shares have to be sold. Here, the sum brings on the countable times of discontinuity of X,
is the continuous part of X. We note that all the terms involved in the cost function are integrable, thanks to the assumption on the square integrability of X and N .
Remark 2.1. The cost defined by (4) in the price model (1), (2) and (3) is a deterministic function of (X t ) t∈[0,T ] , (N t ) t∈[0,T ] , S 0 , D 0 and the parameters q, ν, and ǫ. In this remark, we denote by C(X, N, S 0 , D 0 , q) this function when ν and ǫ are given. From (2), (3) and (4), we have the straightforward property C(X, N, S 0 , D 0 , q) = C(−X, −N, −S 0 , −D 0 , q).
Observing that qC(X) 2 , and remarking that qS and qD satisfy (2) and (3) with q = 1, we also get qC(X, N, S 0 , D 0 , q) = C(X, N, qS 0 , qD 0 , 1).
Remark 2.2. Since X is a càglàd process and N is a càdlàg process, we will have to work with làdlàg (with finite right-hand and left-hand limits) processes. When Z is a làdlàg process, we set ∆ − Z t = Z t − Z t− and ∆ + Z t = Z t + − Z t the left and right jumps of Z, and
We also set ∆Z t = Z t+ − Z t− and use the shorthand notation dZ t = dZ c t + ∆Z t . If dZ t = dZ t for some other làdlàg processZ, this means that dZ c t = dZ c t and ∆Z t = ∆Z t . In particular, when Z is càdlàg andZ is càglàd, this means that Z t − Z t− =Z t + −Z t at the jump times.
Then, the optimal execution problem consists in finding an admissible strategy X that minimizes the expected cost E[C(X)] for a given initial position x 0 ∈ R. This problem for x 0 = 0 is directly related to the existence of Price Manipulation Strategies as defined below. [24] is an admissible strategy X such that X 0 = X T + = 0 a.s. for some T > 0 and E[C(X)] < 0.
Definition 2.2. A Price Manipulation Strategy (PMS) in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl
We have the following result that gives a necessary and sufficient condition to exclude PMS. Theorem 2.1. The model does not admit PMS if, and only if the process P is a (F t )-martingale when X ≡ 0. In this case, the optimal strategy X * is given by
and has the expected cost
Theorem 2.1 is proved in Appendix B. It indicates that suitable models for the order flow N should be such that P is a martingale when the strategic trader is absent. In this case, the optimal strategy is very robust in the sense that it does not depend on N , and is therefore the same as the one in the Obizhaeva and Wang model [28] that corresponds to N ≡ 0 and D 0 = 0. In fact, it does not depend either on ǫ and ν, and only depends on ρ. However, this result is obtained in an idealized framework where the market can be precisely described by the price model (1), (2) and (3) and where the strategic trader knows the model parameters.
If this model can be well fitted to market data, one may expect that the process P to be, roughly speaking, nearly a martingale. This raises at least three questions. Which "simple" processes N can lead to a martingale price P ? Can we characterize the optimal strategy when P is not a martingale? It would be interesting to understand how the optimal strategy (7) may be modified by other market orders. Last, when P is not a martingale, can we find strategies that still have a negative expected cost if the strategic trader has a wrong estimation of the parameters? In this paper, we study these questions when N follows either a Poisson or a Hawkes process.
Remark 2.3. The model can be generalized by adding a càdlàg (F t )-martingale S 0 to the price process P , i.e. if we replace (1) by P t = S t + D t + S 0 t , with S 0 0 = 0. This does not change the optimal execution problem since, using an integration by parts, S 0 adds the following term to the cost
which has a zero expected value from the martingale property. Let us note that there is no covariation between the processes X and S 0 since they do not jump simultaneously and X has bounded variations.
Remark 2.4. Similarly, when N is a càdlàg (F t )-martingale and X is an admissible liquidating strategy for X 0 = x 0 , we have
Therefore, X is optimal if, and only if X ǫ is optimal in the model with no permanent impact, q = 1 and an incoming flow of market orders equal to (1 − ν)N .
Main results
In this work, we consider either a Poisson or a Hawkes process for N , which leads to the two following models.
The Mixed-market-Impact Poisson (MIP) model. Poisson processes are often used to model the arrival of the customers in queuing theory. It is therefore natural to use them to model the flow of market orders, as it has been made for example by Bayraktar and Ludkovski [10] or Cont and de Larrard [13] in different frameworks. To be consistent with the parametrization of Hawkes process, we distinguish the incoming buy and sell orders. Thus, we set
where (N + t ) t∈[0,T ] and (N − t ) t∈[0,T ] are two independent compound Poisson processes of respective intensities κ + 0 and κ − 0 . We assume that their jumps follow the same probability law µ on R + , and we define
and assume that m 2 < ∞.
The Mixed-market-Impact Hawkes (MIH) model. The Hawkes model extends the previous one. It ] are two self and mutually-exciting jump processes, with the same common law µ for the jump amplitudes. Their respective intensities κ + t and κ − t are now assumed to be càdlàg processes which follow the Markovian Hawkes dynamics:
with ι c , ι s , β, κ ∞ ≥ 0, and where J + (resp. J − ) is a càdlàg jump process that counts the number of buy market orders (resp. sell market orders) from environment traders since time 0, and the two processes cannot jump simultaneously. In other words, J = J + − J − jumps of ±1 when N jumps and we have ∆J t = sign(∆N t ). This model boils down to the Poisson model in the case ι c = ι s = β = 0. The meaning of the parameters is rather clear: κ + and κ − are mean reverting processes, and the parameters ι s and ι c respectively describe how a market buy order increases the instantaneous probability of buy (resp. sell) orders. More precisely, ι s encodes both the splitting of meta-orders, and the fact that participants tend to follow market trends (which is called the herding effect). Empirically, it is found by Tòth et al. [33] that the main contribution comes from the splitting effect. The parameter ι c describes opportunistic traders that sell (resp. buy) after a sudden rise (resp. fall) of the price.
Hawkes processes have been recently used in the literature to model the price. In particular, Bacry et al. [7] consider this model with ν = 1, ι s = 0, and deterministic jumps (i.e. µ is a Dirac mass). More recently, Bacry and Muzy [9] have proposed an four-dimensional Hawkes process to model the market buy and sell orders together with the up and down events on the price. In contrast, the model that we study here determines the price impact of an order in function of its size.
The main results are the following.
• The optimal execution problem can be solved explicitly in the MIH model and the optimal strategy has still a quite simple form, see Theorem 5.1. Of course, this result relies on the assumptions of linear price impact and exponential decay kernel, which are not in accordance with empirical facts, see for example Potters and Bouchaud [29] and Bouchaud et al. [12] . We mention here that it would be possible to keep an affine structure of the optimal strategy by considering complete monotone decay kernels as in Alfonsi and Schied [4] . However, we believe that the optimal strategy is interesting at least from a qualitative point of view, since it gives clear insights on how to react optimally to observed market orders and on the role of the different parameters of the model.
• Price Manipulation Strategies necessarily appear in the MIP model. They mainly arise from the fact that the strategy which consists in trading instantly half of the volume of each incoming market order in the opposite direction is profitable on average, since the price resilience of the market is modeled as deterministic and the jump rate of N is constant.
• In the MIH model, Price Manipulation Strategies also arise. Depending on the parameters of the model and on the size of each observed market order, one should trade instantly in the opposite direction as in the MIP model or in the same direction to take advantage of the self-excitation property of Hawkes processes. However, the Hawkes framework allows for a very specific equilibrium to take place, that we call the Mixed-market-Impact Hawkes Martingale (MIHM) model, where PMS disappear. When fitting the MIH to market data, one may then expect to get parameters close to the MIHM model.
• In the MIHM model, one has in particular ι s > ι c , ν < 1 and β = ρ, i.e. the self-excitation property of the order flow exactly compensates the price resilience induced by market makers. The resulting price process is a martingale even at high frequencies, and in this case we find that the optimal strategy and cost function are those of Obizhaeva and Wang [28] . The conditions of this model imply that if ι c = 0, the norm α/β of the Hawkes kernel that symbolizes the endogeneity ratio of the market, see Filimonov and Sornette [17] , should be equal to 1 − ν, i.e. the proportion of market impact which is transient.
• The fact of reacting to the market orders of other traders with instantaneous market orders may be seen as artificial volume that could lead to market instability. We show that in the MIH framework, the conditions under which it is profitable for the strategic trader to react instantaneously to other trades is quite equivalent to the existence of PMS. This makes the connection between market stability and free profits.
The Mixed-market-Impact Poisson (MIP) model
We will use the following function in the sequel
where E(y) = − +∞ −y e −u u du is the exponential integral of y, in terms of Cauchy principal value if y > 0. Since we will only consider differences E(y) − E(y ′ ) with either y, y ′ > 0 or y, y ′ < 0, we will only consider proper integrals. The function E is standard and is implemented in many packages such as the Boost C++ library. Thus, L can be evaluated as a closed formula.
The optimal strategy
The following theorem gives the optimal strategy and the value function of the problem in the Poisson model. 
and, on (0, T ),
The corresponding cost function is given by
where G 0 (T ) = 1 + ν 2 ρT . In particular, the model admits price manipulation strategies unless m 1 = m 2 = 0 (i.e. N ≡ 0) and D 0 = 0.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.3.1. When m 1 = m 2 = 0, there is no other orders and we get back the results in the Obizhaeva and Wang model [28] . In this case, the steady state is D 0 = 0 and there is no price manipulation strategy, see Alfonsi and Schied [3] . Otherwise, Poissonian market orders always create possible manipulation strategies, which we discuss now in detail.
First, we observe that the most important source of gains in (12) is in O(T 3 ) when T is getting large. It appears when δ 0 = 0, which means that there is a price tendency. There is a predictable imbalance in the order flow of which the strategic trader can take advantage. The corresponding arbitrages are the δ 0 terms in the strategy given in Theorem 4.1, and the associated expected gains are the negative terms proportional to δ 2 0 in the value function. Also, we observe that when δ 0 = 0, the gain goes to infinity when ρ → 0. This infinite gain can be reached by the following admissible strategy X λ ∆X λ 0 = λδ 0 , dX λ t = 0 for t ∈ (0, T ) , ∆X λ T = −λδ 0 , for some λ ∈ R. From (4), we have when ρ = 0, C(X λ ) = −λδ 0 NT q and therefore
We now consider the "balanced case" where δ 0 = 0. This means that the flows of buy and sell orders have the same distribution, which is a rather natural assumption. In this case, the negative cost grows in O(T ) and we have
The term in d 2 is due to the fact that the strategic trader knows the initial temporary price shift and takes advantage of this information. The other term comes from the dynamic part of the strategy, in which the strategic trader reacts instantaneously to price jumps to take advantage of their transient part. It vanishes when ρ → 0 + or ν → 1 − since in both cases, the price impact becomes exclusively permanent.
Last, let us give some heuristic interpretation on the optimal strategy. When the strategic trader observes a market order at time τ , he immediately posts a market order of the opposite sign, with a proportion
of the volume. This allows him to take advantage of the deterministic resilience effect. He then compensates this block trade by modifying his continuous trading rate of 1−ν 1−ǫ × ρ 2+ρ(T −τ ) ∆N τ (with the sign opposite to his block trade), see Figure 1 for an illustration of this strategy. If moreover δ 0 = 0, he takes advantage of the price trend by trading continuously at a time-dependent rate, and also adapts the initial jump of the strategy accordingly. 
Price manipulation strategies with model uncertainty
Theorem 4.1 shows that PMS exist when the market orders follow a compound Poisson process. However, this result holds under the assumption that the strategic trader knows exactly what the model parameters are. It is then natural to wonder if these PMS may disappear when he has a wrong estimation of some parameters. In this section, we focus on the case where the buy and sell orders are balanced (δ 0 = 0), which means that there is no expected trend in the next future. A remarkable feature of the optimal strategy in this case is that it only depends on the process N , and does not depend directly on the law of the jumps and their intensity. Then, when applying the optimal strategy, only two quantities have to be known: qD 0 and ρ. In this paragraph, we consider a trader that wants to make profit without moving their position, and therefore uses the optimal liquidation strategy with x 0 = 0 shares. We assume without loss of generality that S 0 = 0 and denote by C 0 (D 0 ) the cost of the optimal strategy of Theorem 4.1 in this case:
First, we assume that he knows ρ but not D 0 . Then, we assume that he knows that D 0 = 0, but does not know the true value of ρ. In both cases, we show that the trader can still make profits on average. In particular, he can do this by using the basic strategy that consists in trading half of the volume (times
of each incoming market order in the opposite direction. This indicates that modeling the time stamps of market orders as a Poisson process is not compatible in our model with eliminating PMS.
Uncertainty on D 0
In this paragraph, we assume that D 0 = d 0 is deterministic and that the strategic trader applies the optimal strategy computed with a false valued 0 . His strategyX is then
Proposition 4.1. The expected cost of the strategyX is given by
and is nonpositive if, and only if |d
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix C.1. We obtain that PMS with deadline T disappear if the error in the estimation of d 0 exceeds ∆d 0 (T ). We can check that
More importantly, we observe that the choiced 0 = 0 always leads to a PMS for any deadline T and should be used if no better estimation is available.
Uncertainty on ρ
To study the uncertainty effects on the parameter ρ, we conduct a reasoning similar to the previous paragraph, assuming now that we apply the optimal strategy with a false value ofρ of ρ. To simplify the calculations, we place ourselves in the case d 0 = 0 which is the asymptotic average value of D, since N is a martingale. The strategyX of the strategic trader is then given by
This strategyX would be optimal ifρ = ρ, with the expected cost
The expected cost of the strategyX is given by
The function f is negative, nonincreasing on (0, 1] and nondecreasing on [1, ∞), andX is thus a PMS.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is postponed to Appendix C.2. This results shows the robustness of the PMS obtained by the optimal execution problem with respect to the estimation of ρ. When takingρ = 0, the strategyX is the very basic one which consists in trading half of the volume times (1 − ν)/(1 − ǫ) of each incoming market order in the opposite direction.
To be more quantitative, in the worst-case underestimation scenario (r → 0 + ), we get from (55) that
, which is only divided by two with respect to the case where ρ is known. Similarly, in the worst-case overestimation scenario (r → +∞), the asymptotic expected cost
(1−ǫ)q × 2κ 0 m 2 × ρT 2 /12 obtained from (56) equals two thirds of the one when ρ is known.
Transaction costs
The last subsection demonstrates the robustness of the PMS in the Poisson model. However, such strategies may be no longer relevant if there are transaction costs. We now consider the effect of proportional transaction costs, that can arise in practice from the crossing of the bid-ask spread or from transaction fees imposed by the market organizer, for instance. Only in this subsection, we assume that any market order of signed volume v undergoes the additional cost γ|v|, with γ ≥ 0 a constant. We still consider the balanced model with δ 0 = 0 and, for simplicity, d 0 = 0. Also, we focus on the existence of PMS and assume x 0 = 0. Solving explicitly the optimal execution problem with proportional transaction costs is not obvious. However, it would be natural for the strategic trader to consider a strategy which is a linear interpolation between the optimal one when there is no transaction cost and the strategy that ignores the jumps of N , which is optimal when γ → +∞. This leads to consider the strategy X θ computed with a process
In the present context, this yields X θ = θ × X * , where X * is given by Theorem 4.1 when
We can compute the expected value of this strategy (see Appendix C.3)
The bracket term is increasing with respect to θ and is minimal for θ = 0. This leads to the following result.
is a PMS, and it is the optimal choice among all the strategies X θ , θ ∈ [0, 1]. If γ ≥ γ c T , none of these strategies lead to a PMS.
Therefore, having γ ≥ γ c T for any T > 0 is a necessary (but not sufficient) to exclude PMS. From a regulatory perspective, requiring this condition either by fixing the tick size or by adding transaction costs would be a way to restrict the PMS in the Poisson framework. Although γ c T cannot be determined analytically, we have the following result.
The proof of this Lemma is given in Appendix C.3. The limits when T → +∞ gives some quantitative insights on the value of the critical threshold that are in line with heuristic arguments. If the liquidity level q is high or ν is close to one, the temporary price impact of market orders from environment traders is small and the strategic trader can make less profit by reacting to these orders. Also, the higher the ratio m 2 /m 1 , the higher the variance of the volume of incoming orders, the larger the arbitrage opportunities when big market orders are placed on the book. Interestingly, γ c ∞ does depend on κ 0 that tunes the instantaneous traded volume.
Low-frequency asymptotics
In this section, we study the price process (P t ) in the absence of the strategic trader, and we are interested in the behaviour of P at a large time scale when buy and sell orders are balanced, i.e. δ 0 = 0. To do so, we first analyze the process D and show that it is ergodic. To do so, we introduce the processes
. These processes are independent, nonnegative and such that D = D + − D − . Proposition 4.4. As t goes to infinity, D + t converges in distribution to an a.s. positive and finite random variable D + ∞ . The Laplace transform of the limit law is given by
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix D.1. It gives immediately that D t converges in law to a random variable
× κ0m2 ρ . To study the low-frequency asymptotics of the price process P , we have to rescale accordingly price and time. We then consider the sequence P
On the one hand, the process D (n) converges to zero from the ergodic property of D. On the other hand, the process S 
It is interesting to notice that the MIP model is compatible with low-frequency dynamics that exclude arbitrages, even though it allows PMS at a short time scale. Figure 2 illustrates this convergence and shows that the relative importance of D with respect to S vanishes as the time scale increases. 
. We plot D t and S t − S 0 (above), and P t /100 (below), over the time scales: T 2 = 1 (left), T 1 = 25 (middle), T 0 = 400 (right). The scaling of the graphs with respect to the time scale is square root.
For i ≥ 0 and t ∈ [τ i , τ i+1 ), we obtain that δ t exp(βt) = δ 0 + αΘ i only depends on t through the integer i = χ t . Last, we define the differentiable function ζ : R → R + by
and 
The optimal strategy
In this MIH model, the five state variables of the problem are X t , D t , S t , δ t and Σ t . To describe the optimal strategy and the value function, we distinguish the cases α = β and α = β. The general case α = β is stated in Theorem 5.1 below. When α = β, some simplifications occur in the formulas. Theorem A.1 gives the optimal execution strategy and its cost in this case. The proof of these theorems is given in Appendix A. We introduce some notations, and define η = β − α.
We refer to (11) and (19) for the definitions of L and ζ, and we also set for
Theorem 5.1. Let ǫ ∈ [0, 1). When η = β − α = 0, the optimal strategy X * is given by
The value function function of the problem is then:
The functions e and g are the unique solution of the differential equations (33) and (34) with e(0) = g(0) = 0. When η = 0, the optimal strategy is given by Theorem A.1.
Let us mention here that the functions e and g admit explicit forms by the mean of the exponential integral function, that are very cumbersome. They can be obtained by using a formal calculus software such as Mathematica. Since they do not play any role for the optimal strategy and require several pages to be displayed, we do not give these explicit formulas except in the case α = β, see Theorem A.1.
It is worth to notice that the optimal strategy X * is affine with respect to x 0 , D 0 , δ 0 , J and N . This is due to the affine structure of the model and the quadratic costs. In particular, the reaction of the optimal strategy to the other trades does not depend on x 0 . Also, the optimal strategy can be seen as the sum of the strategy (7) which is optimal when D 0 = δ 0 = 0 and J ≡ N ≡ 0 and the optimal PMS which is given by Theorem 5.1 when x 0 = 0.
Let us make some comments on the optimal strategy and more precisely how the strategic trader reacts to the other orders. Quite similarly to the Poisson case, the trade that follows immediately an order is compensated by the continuous trading rate. Contrary to the Poisson model, this trade is not always contrary to the previous market order. Namely, in the case where η = νρ, the strategic trader makes a trade in the opposite direction if |dN t | > αm1 ρ(1−ν) , but trades in the same way otherwise. The same conclusion holds for any parameter value when T − t → 0. We now consider the asymptotics when the trading horizon is large: in this case, it is likely to assume that η > 0 which is required to get stationary intensities κ + and κ − , see Section 5.3. Then, when T − t → +∞ the jump part of the optimal strategy can be well approximated by
Therefore, the strategic trader makes a trade in the opposite direction if |dN t | > αm1 2ρ(1−ν) (1 + ρν η ) and trades in the same direction otherwise. Heuristically, we can understand this behavior as follows when ι c = 0. In the MIH model, market orders all have the same excitation on the intensity. If a market buy order is relatively small, it may be a part of a big split order, and thus be followed by other buy orders that will make the price go up, and the strategic trader has interest to follow this trend. However, if a market buy order is relatively big, the price resilience effect is likely to dominate and the strategic trader has interest to trade in the opposite way, as in the Poisson model.
Last, it is interesting to notice that the optimal strategy only depends on (ι s , ι c ) through α = ι s − ι c . This key self-excitation parameter tunes the way that the strategic trader should react to other market orders. 20) or µ = Dirac(0) with D 0 = 0. In both these cases, the optimal execution strategy is given by (7) .
The Mixed-Impact Hawkes Martingale (MIHM) model and manipulation strategies
To be precise, when m 1 = 0, N ≡ 0 and the MIH model does not depend any longer on the parameters α and β, that can then be fixed arbitrarily.
Proof. From Theorem 2.1, PMS are excluded if, and only if the price P is a martingale when X ≡ 0. In this case, we have from (1), (2), (3) and (18) dP t = −ρD t dt + 1
Therefore, P is a martingale if, and only if m1 ρ δ t = qD t P-a.s., dt a.e. This condition is equivalent to qD 0 = m1 ρ δ 0 and qdD t = m1 ρ dδ t . From (3) and (18), the latter condition is equivalent to
which leads to (20) . Conversely, (20) implies m1 ρ δ t = qD t , and P is then a martingale.
Remark 5.1. When β = ρ, α = (1 − ν)ρ, µ = Dirac(m 1 ), we get from the previous calculations that d( m1 q δ t − ρD t ) = −ρ( m1 q δ t − ρD t )dt, and therefore m1 q δ t − ρD t converges exponentially to zero. The condition qD 0 = m1 ρ δ 0 simply means that the model starts from this steady state.
One can also check directly that the optimal strategy and its cost given by First, the condition β = ρ means that the mean-reverting action of liquidity providers compensates the autocorrelation in the signs of the trades of liquidity takers ; we thus reach a conclusion similar to Bouchaud et al. [12] . The condition α = (1 − ν)β gives a link between the Hawkes kernel and the proportion 1 − ν of transient price impact. When ι c = 0, α/β represents the average number of child orders coming from one market order, and is thus equal to the proportion of endogenous orders (i.e. triggered by other orders) in the market. What we obtain here is that this ratio should be equal to 1 − ν, which is a a priori different measure of endogeneity, since it gives the proportion of market impact that does not influence the low-frequency price (see Section 5.3). The positivity of α reflects the fact that the parameter ι c tuning opportunistic trading should be small to avoid market instability. Last, it is interesting to notice that µ should be a Dirac mass, which means that market orders should be in principle all of the same size. This is a consequence of the modeling that assumes that any market order has the same excitation on the intensity, regardless of its size. However, if we admit that orders that have roughly the same size have a similar impact, the size of market orders should cluster around some values. Typically, the most common size should be the average size that moves the price of one tick.
Of course, in practice, it would be miraculous if the estimation of the MIH model to market data led to parameters satisfying exactly (20) . Market frictions such as transaction costs (and the crossing of the bid-ask spread) or the latency to execute an order increase the execution costs (see Stoikov and Waeber [32] ) and then limit possible PMS. Therefore, one may expect that an estimation of the MIH to market data gives parameters that are not too far away but different from the condition (20) . Then, the optimal strategy given by Theorem 5.1 is useful and should give better perform than the one given by (7) . The practical implementation of the MIH model on market data is left for future research.
The framework of the MIH model also gives some interesting insights for the characterization of the existence of short-time arbitrages. Let us introduce the following definition.
Definition 5.1. We say that a market admits weak Price Manipulation Strategies (wPMS) if the cost of a liquidation strategy can be reduced by trading immediately after other market orders. 
or µ = Dirac(0).
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward from Theorem 5.1. The jump term
cannot be almost surely equal to zero if µ is not a Dirac mass, and we necessarily have µ = Dirac(m 1 ). When m 1 > 0, this leads to
which precisely gives (21) . The converse implication is obvious.
By Remark 5.1, the condition qD 0 = m1 ρ δ 0 means that the model has reached its equilibrium, which is basically the case after some time. Therefore, the conditions that exclude wPMS and PMS in the MIH model are quite the same. This is an interesting link between two different point of views. The condition "no PMS" means that there is no free source of income. The condition "no wPMS" rather brings on market stability, since it excludes artificial trading volume coming from the response to other trades.
Law of the price process and low-frequency asymptotics
In this section, we are interested in price asymptotics when the strategic trader is absent, i.e. X ≡ 0. We first focus on the intensities κ + and κ − . From (10), we have
We know that this process converges to a stationary law if ι s + ι c = α + 2ι c < β, see e.g. equation (6) of Bacry et al. [7] . Since δ t = δ 0 exp(−βt) + α t 0 exp(−β(t − s))dJ s and J t − t 0 δ s ds is a martingale, one has
where κ := κ ∞ 1 − (α + 2ι c )/β otherwise. We then have the following result. The quantity of ν × ρ can be seen as a stationarity margin left for cross-excitation in market orders. If this condition is violated, the price process is still a martingale but the mutual excitation between buy and sell orders makes the volatility increase exponentially.
We now study the low-frequency asymptotics of the price process P . As in the Poisson case, we consider the sequence P (n) t = P nt / √ n for n ≥ 1. We have P
To study the behaviour of D (n) , we need the following lemma that is proved in Appendix D.2.
t ] converges when t → +∞.
Thanks to this lemma, (D (n) t1 , . . . , D (n) t k ) converges to zero for the L 2 norm for any 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t k . This gives that the process D (n) converges to zero. We now focus on the convergence of S
To do so, we apply Corollary 1 of Bacry et al. [8] . It gives the convergence in law of
Brownian motion. Therefore,
where W is a standard Brownian motion. Let us now assume that the jumps are bounded, i.e. ∃K > 0, µ([0, K]) = 1.
Then, it is not difficult to adapt the proof of Bacry et al. [8] and in particular Lemma 7 of [8] to get that
. This leads to the following result. 
We get back the result of Proposition 4.5 in the MIP model when ι c = ι s = 0 and κ 0 = κ ∞ , and get again a Bachelier model at a low frequency. Figure 4 illustrates the convergence. It is interesting to notice that we haveP
in the MIHM model, and we get that the volatility explodes when ι c → νρ 2 , which is in line with Remark 5.2. The volatility ofP is greater than 1 q 2κ∞m2 ν and goes to +∞ when the permanent impact ν goes to 0, which is different from the Poisson case. A Proof for the optimal control problem (Theorems 4.1, A.1 and 5.1)
A.1 Notations and methodology
In the general Hawkes model, the jump intensity of the process (N t ) is characterized by the càdlàg Markovian process (δ t , Σ t ) defined by (18) , taking values in R × R + , which is constant and equal to its initial value in the Poisson model. The state variable of the problem is then (X t , D t , S t , δ t , Σ t ), and the control is X t − x 0 , i.e. the variation of the position of the strategic trader, (X t ) t∈[0,T ] being an admissible strategy as described in Definition 2.1. The control program is thus to minimize E [C(0, X)] over all admissible strategies, where the cost C(t, X) of the strategy X between t and T is given by
The final value at time t = T is the cost of a market order of signed volume ∆X T = −X T (so that X T + = X T + ∆X T = 0). At time t, the price P t depends on D t and S t which in turn depend on (X u ) u∈[0,t] . The value function of the problem is
with X t = x, D t = d, S t = z, δ t = δ and Σ t = Σ. In order to determine analytically the value function and the optimal control of the problem, we use the probabilistic formulation of the verification theorem. We determine a priori a continuously differentiable function C(t, x, d, z, δ, Σ) and an admissible strategy X * and we verify that
is a submartingale for any admissible strategy X, and that Π t (X * ) is a martingale. We proceed in three steps:
1. We define a suitable function C, and derive a set of ODEs on its coefficients which is a necessary condition for C to be the value function of the problem. This step is common to the Poisson model (α = β = 0, δ t ≡ δ 0 , Σ t ≡ Σ 0 ), and the cases (0 < α = β) and (α = β) for the Hawkes model.
2.
We solve the set of ODEs by distinguishing the cases α = β and α = β.
3. Using the results of the previous steps, we derive the strategy X * such that Π t (X * ) is a martingale.
Here, we must distinguish the cases α = β = 0, 0 < α = β and α = β.
The verification argument then yields that C(t, x, d, z, δ, Σ) is the value function and that X * is optimal. Without loss of generality, we can assume that q = 1 by using Remark 2.1.
A.2 Necessary conditions on the value function
We search a cost function C as a generic quadratic form of the variables x, d, z, δ, Σ with time-dependent coefficient (the variable z symbolizes the current value of the fundamental price S t ). As we see further, we need C to verify ∂ x C + (1 − ǫ)∂ d C + ǫ ∂ z C + d + z = 0 : it is thus necessary that C is a quadratic form of (d − (1 − ǫ)x), (z − ǫx), δ and Σ, plus a term −(d + z) 2 /2. We define
with a, b, c, e, g : R + → R continuously differentiable functions. We choose the limit condition C(T, x, d, z, δ, Let us note that other terms should be added in equation (24) for C to be a generic quadratic form. The five terms
have to be equal to zero since C(t, x, d, z, δ, Σ) = C(t, −x, −d, −z, −δ, Σ) by using Remark 2.1 and the fact that the buy and sell orders play a symmetric role. For the term in Σ 2 , we checked in prior calculations that it is necessarily associated to a zero coefficient. For ∆x ∈ R, we have
The process C(t, X t , D t , S t , δ t , Σ t ) is làdlàg, and with the notations of Remark 2.2, we have by using (25) 
The definition of Π(X) given by (23) 
We define the continuous finite variation process (A X t ) t∈(0,T ) such that A X 0 + = C(0, X 0 + , D 0 + , S 0 + , δ 0 , Σ 0 ) and for t ∈ (0, T )
Then, Π(X)−A X is a martingale (let us note that almost surely, dt -a.e. on (0, T ),
). This yields that Π(X) is a submartingale (resp. a martingale) iff A X is increasing (resp. constant). From (25) , we obtain ∂ x C(t, x, d, z, δ, Σ) + (1 − ǫ)∂ d C(t, x, d, z, δ, Σ) + ǫ ∂ z C(t, x, d, z, δ, Σ) + d + z = 0, and then
Given the quadratic nature of the problem, we search a process A X of the form
with j, k : R + → R continuously differentiable functions, in order to obtain an non-decreasing process A X that can be constant for a specific strategy X * . Let us note Y t :
and thus
where we consider C as a function of the variables t, x, d, z, δ, Σ as in equation (26), and substitute d − (1 − ǫ)x by y and z − ǫx by ξ in the results. We then make the change of variables (x, d, z, δ, Σ) → (y, d, ξ, δ, Σ), and we identify each term of equations (26) and (27):
(Eq. dy) yields j = (1 − ǫ)a + ǫ 2 . We input this relation in (Eq. y 2 ) and we havej = (1 − ǫ)ȧ = −ρj 2 thus 
We obtain two conditions on the coefficients of the process A X j(u) = 1 2 + ρu ,
and the following set of necessary conditions on the coefficients of C a(u) = 1 1 − ǫ
b(0) = c(0) = e(0) = g(0) = 0.
The resolution of this set of equations determines entirely the function C(t, x, d, z, δ, Σ) defined in (24) . This is the purpose of the next step of this proof. Let us note that at this stage, we already know that the system given by Equations (28) to (34) admits a unique solution, and that the function C which solves the system is the value function of the problem by using the verification argument.
A.3 Resolution of the system of ODEs
First of all, we use Equation (30) to simplify the function C. The constant term (w.r.t. the time variable t) in equation (24) is 2 and this constant term can be rewritten as 
Equation (32) can be rewritten aṡ
We have u + ν 2 ρu 2 = ν 2 u(2 + ρu) + (1 − ν)u, thus
Using the final condition c(0) = 0, we have
We set e(u) =ẽ(u) exp(2ι c u) and we havė , one has
and we obtain
We verify that for k ∈ N and u ≥ 0, . We plug these results in equation (34) to get
In the case ι c = 0, one simply has I k (u) = u k+1 k+1 and 1 ρ u 0 exp(2ι c s)L(ρ, −2ι c , s)ds = u + 2 ρ × 1 ρ ln 1 + ρu 2 − u ρ , and the functions e and g can be deduced easily from (37) and (38).
To determine the value functions C of Theorems 4.1 (β = 0) and A.1 (β > 0), we recall equation (35) and we observe that
with G 0 (u) := 1 + ν 2 ρu.
Thus,
This yields the expressions of the value function in We obtain
where ζ is defined in (19) and
Equation (29) then gives
In order to avoid cumbersome calculations, we use a prior determination of the function c, and we check that it satisfies c(0) = 0 and that it is a solution of the ODE (32) . We define
We have indeed c(0) = 0. Since
we obtaiṅ
The term 2u(1 + νρu)
This yields using Equations (29) and (43)
and we eventually obtain that the function c defined in (43) is the unique solution of (32) that satisfies c(0) = 0. For the functions e and g, we recall here that they admit explicit but very cumbersome formulas that can be obtained by using a formal calculus software.
A.4 Determination of the optimal strategy
The final step of the proof is to determine the strategy X * such that Π(X * ) is a martingale, or equivalently such that A X * is constant. Equations (27) and (28) yield
Thus, A X * is constant on (0, T ) if, and only if a.s. , dt -a.e. on (0, T ) ,
where D = D * when the strategy X * is used by the strategic trader. Then, we characterize the strategy X * on [0, T ] with the three following steps:
• The initial jump ∆X * 0 of the strategy is such that (X * , D * ) satisfies equation (44) at time t = 0 + .
• The strategy X * on (0, T ) is obtained by differentiating equation (44).
• The final jump ∆X * T = −X * T closes the position of the strategic trader at time T .
We now use this resolution protocol separately in the Poisson model α = β = 0, and in the Hawkes model max(|α|, β) > 0 where we distinguish the two sub-cases α = β > 0 and α = β.
A.4.1 Case of the Poisson model (Theorem 4.1)
Equations (36) and (44) give the following condition on the strategy X * a.s., dt -a.e. on (0, T ),
The initial jump of X * at t = 0 is such that (45) is verified for t = 0 + :
In this case, δ t ≡ δ 0 is constant and we obtain by differentiating (45)
This yields dD
2+ρ(T −t) , and we determine D * t explicitly on (0, T ):
which gives
We obtain for t ∈ (0, T )
Equation (45) finally yields 
In this sub-case, we have α = β as in the Poisson model and Equation (45) still holds. Moreover, Equation (46) also holds since the process (δ t ) t≥0 and the constant process equal to δ 0 coincide at time t = 0. This yields the initial jump ∆X * 0 of the strategy X * . Now, in the case α = β > 0, (δ t ) is a càdlàg process of dynamics dδ t = −β δ t dt + β dJ t . We thus obtain by differentiating (45)
where the explicit value of δ t is given by δ t = δ 0 exp(−βt) + β 0<τ ≤t exp(−β(t − τ )) ∆J τ , and we define for
.
We now determine D * t : for t ∈ (0, T ),
We have
Let us focus on the calculation of
The function Φ 0 must then be determined. For t ∈ [0, T ], we have 2+ρu du, this yields (see (11) for the definition of L)
We thus have for t ∈ (0, T )
and we eventually obtain the strategy X * on (0, T )
and the final jump at time T (using equation (45))
In the case α = β, the optimal strategy X * in the MIH model is given by (46), (48) and (49). The value function function of the problem is then
where for u ∈ [0, T ], G 0 (u) = 1 + ν 2 ρu and e and g are given by (37) and (38).
Case α = β (Theorem 5.1)
We use Equations (42) and (44) to obtain the following characterization of the strategy X * : a.s., dt-a.e. on (0, T ),
The initial jump of X * at t = 0 is such that (50) is verified for t = 0 + :
In the case α = β, we have dδ t = −β δ t dt + α dJ t . We differentiate Equation (50)
which yields
where for t ∈ [0, T ]
and we have
To determine the function Φ η , we write We obtain the expression of D * t for t ∈ (0, T )
The strategy X * on (0, T ) is given by
and the final jump at time T (using equation (50)) 
B Proof of Theorem 2.1
Let X be an admissible strategy. We introduce the following processes:
with D N 0 = D 0 and D X 0 = 0. Thus, we have S = S N + S X , D = D N + D X and thus P = P N + P X , where P N = S N + D N and P X = S X + D X . From (4), we have C(X) = 
is a deterministic function of X that corresponds to the cost when N ≡ 0, which is the Obizhaeva and Wang model. We now make an integration by parts as in Remark 2.3 and get that To check the monotonicity property of f , it is sufficient to check that A is nonnegative for r > 0. To do so, we use that Let us now study the limits of f as r → 0 + and r → +∞. We have the following expansion L(ρr, −ρ, T ) = 
We now study the limits f 0 and f ∞ as functions of ρT . We have f 0 (0 + ) = 0, f ′ 0 (y) = − 1−exp(−y) 4 < 0 for y > 0, thus f 0 is negative and decreasing. Since we get y 2 f ′ ∞ (y) = exp(−y) − 1 + y − y 2 /2 < 0 for y > 0, and f ∞ (0 + ) = 0. Therefore, f ∞ is negative and decreasing as well, and we have the results of Proposition 4.2.
Model

Poisson
Hawkes α = β MIHM ν 0 0. Table 1 : First set of Monte Carlo tests with: q = 100, T = 1, ρ = 50, S 0 = 0, κ + 0 = 25, κ − 0 = 30, m 1 = 50, ǫ = 0.1, X 0 = −500 for the three models and µ = Exp(1/m 1 ), D 0 = 0.1 except for MIHM. For the Monte Carlo simulations, we take n = 40000 paths and a discretization step ∆t = 0.0001. The confidence intervals given in the table are the asymptotic Gaussian intervals of level 95%.
Model
Poisson Table 2 : Second set of Monte Carlo tests with: q = 80, T = 10, ρ = 0.8, S 0 = 0, κ + 0 = 1.5, κ − 0 = 1.1, m 1 = 85, ǫ = 0.4, X 0 = 700 for the three models and µ({k × q}) = (1 − q/m 1 ) k−1 q/m 1 for k ∈ N\{0} , D 0 = 0.1 except for MIHM. For the Monte Carlo simulations, we take n = 40000 paths and a discretization step ∆t = 0.001. The confidence intervals given in the table are the asymptotic Gaussian intervals of level 95%.
